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Abstract
We propose a decentralized collision-avoidance mechanism for a group of independently con-
trolled robots moving on a shared workspace. Existing algorithms achieve multi-robot colli-
sion avoidance either (a) in a centralized seing, or (b) in a decentralized seing with collabo-
rative robots. We focus on the seing with competitive robots in a decentralized environment,
where robots may strategically reveal their information to get prioritized. We propose the
mechanism SPARCAS in this seing that, using principles of mechanism design, ensures
truthful revelation of the robots’ private information and provides locally efficient move-
ment of the robots. It is free from collisions and deadlocks, and handles a dynamic arrival
of robots. In practice, this mechanism scales well for a large number of robots where the
optimal collision-avoiding path-finding algorithm (M*) does not scale. Yet,SPARCAS does
not compromise the path optimality too much. Our mechanism prioritizes the robots in the
order of their ‘true’ higher needs, but for a higher payment. It uses monetary transfers which
is small enough compared to the value received by the robots.
1 Introduction
Collision avoidance is a central problem in various multi-agent path planning applications, and
the problem has been provided different solutions in different paradigms [32, 7, 10, e.g.]. In this
paper, we focus on multiple dynamically arriving and independently controlled robots to move
from their source to their destinations using a track network [17, 4, 40]. As many robots share
the same track network, they are prone to collide with each other. To avoid that, three different
approaches are employed in the literature.
In the first approach, offline multi-robot planning algorithms are employed to generate the
collision-free paths for all the robots statically [13, 35, 41, 34, 38, 28, 29, e.g.]. However, this
approach has two severe drawbacks. First, the computation time for generating path plans for a
large number of robots may be prohibitively large. Second, they cannot deal with the dynamic
arrival of new robots to the system without recomputing the whole plan.
1
In the second approach, the robots independently generate their trajectories offline without
the knowledge about the trajectories of the other robots [2, 8, 20, 24, 23, 19, 25, 36, 32, 11, 7, e.g.].
Hence, the trajectories of the robots are not collision-free, but are resolved online in a decen-
tralized manner through information exchange among the potentially colliding robots, assuming
that the robots will cooperatewith their movements. If the simultaneous movements of the robots
are not possible, the robots run a distributed consensus algorithm to find a collision-free plan.
In the third approach, robots interact in an auction-like seing and bid for their makespan or
demand for resource [21, 3, 22, 6]. Algorithms are designed for certain optimality objectives.
However, these approaches do not allow robots to be owned and controlled by independent
agents, and therefore do not ensure that these agents bid their privately observed information
(makespan or demand of resource) truthfully to each other or to the planner. However, the com-
binatorial auction reduction of theMAPF problem [1] does satisfy truthtelling, but it is centralized
and therefore has the same limitations of time complexity and dynamic arrival. e other strand
of literature [33, 12] on non-cooperative robots consider other robots as dynamic obstacles and
solve computationally hard mixed integer programs in a centralized manner.
We note that in many commercial seings the robots are controlled by independent operators,
e.g., in autonomous vehicle movements, and the robots can potentially manipulate their bids for
a prioritized scheduling. In this paper, we exploit the full strength of mechanism design to ensure
truthtelling along with other desirable properties like collision and deadlock avoidance.
Our Approach and Results
We propose a decentralized mechanism for a group of robots that move on a shared workspace
avoiding collision with each other. A collision situation arises when multiple robots try to si-
multaneously access a common location. e competitive robots in our seing engage in a spot
auction and bid the amount they are willing to pay to get access to those locations. In our pro-
tocol, the robots that ‘win’ the auction get access to move, but for a payment. e challenge
in designing such a protocol is to choose the winners and their payments such that the robots
provide their private valuations for the access locations truthfully.
To this end, we consider a quasi-linear payoff model [31, Chap 10] for the robots and pro-
pose SPot Auction-based Robotic Collision Avoidance Scheme (SPARCAS). We show that
SPARCAS is decentralized, collision-free, deadlock-free, and robust against entry-exit (Claim 1).
e mechanism ensures that every competitive robot reveals its private information truthfully in
this spot auction (eorem 1), does not have a positive surplus of money, and is locally efficient
(eorem 2).
We run extensive experiments in §6 to evaluate the performance of SPARCAS in practice.
We show that SPARCAS (1) scales well with large number of robots, (2) takes much less plan-
ning and execution times compared to that of M* [38] and prioritized planning [35], (3) does dif-
ferentiated prioritization of different classes of robots, and (4) handles dynamic arrivals smoothly.
We have simulated our mechanism for up to 500 robots in Python experimental setup and up
to 10 TurtleBots [14] using ROS [26]. Successful simulation in ROS promises that the proposed
mechanism can be implemented in a real multi-robot system.
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2 Problem Setup
Define [n] := {1, . . . , n}. Let N = [n] be the set of robots that are trying to travel from their
sources to destinations in a decentralized manner over a graph G = (V,E), where V is the
vertex set and E is the edge set. All edges represent full-duplex paths, i.e., robots can travel on
both directions on this edge following usual traffic rules. Time is discrete and is denoted by the
variable t. Every edge in the graph is partitioned into slots where a robot can stand at any given
time step. Every slot is uniquely numbered between 1, . . . , S, whereS is the total number of slots.
We represent the k-th slot by xk, k ∈ [S]. We call every vertex having a degree of three or more
an intersection point, since robots moving into such vertices cannot guarantee to avoid a collision
without coordinating with each other. In practice, an actual intersection will be a roundabout
having a fixed number of slots. Every roundabout can hold robots equal to the number of slots
at any given time and the movement of all the robots is unidirectional (e.g., counter-clockwise).
An illustration of the paths and the roundabout is given in Figure 1. A vertex with degree larger
than four can be equivalently represented using a larger roundabout that can accommodate that
many number of full-duplex paths.
direction of traffic
spot for robot to stand
cells
detailed structure of the following
vertex-edge configuration
Figure 1: Illustration of a vertex with four incident full-duplex edges.
We assume that these robots are independently controlled (or owned) by agents who have no
information about other robots’ locations, sources, and destinations. Each robot has a deadline
to reach its destination, which contributes to its value at each time step, e.g., monetary gain from
the transfer of a shipment to a customer. A necessary goal of this traversal is to ensure that no
collision occurs between the robots.
In a decentralized traversal plan of the robots, every robot decides its path based on its local
information, e.g., those received through its own sensors and shared by other robots in close
proximity. Let the path of robot i ∈ N be denoted by Pi := (xk1 , xk2, . . . , xkl(i)), where xkj ’s
are the slots of the graph leading from the source to the destination of i. When two different
robots reach the same slot at the same time, a collision occurs, which each robot wants to avoid.
Collision can occur (a) at a roundabout where two robots intend to move to the same empty cell,
or (b) on a cell in the edge where a robot is stationary and another robot moves into the same
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cell. Let the current location of robot i at t is denoted by ℓi(t), and the next intended location is
ni(t).
We assume that a robot’s value is calculated internally by the entity that controls it by con-
sidering several factors, e.g., its proximity to the deadline, the type of objects it is carrying (high,
if it is carrying a priority shipping item), and all such factors are consolidated into a real number
vi(t) for robot i if it can move to its next location ni(t) at time t+1. e value is zero if the robot
does not move at t.1
In this paper, our primary objective is to find a decentralized mechanism that (a) uses the cur-
rent and intended location of the nearby robots and ensures truthful revelation of their valuations,
(b) avoids collision, deadlocks, (c) maintains fairness by prioritized scheduling based on higher
willingness-to-pay. We assume that the robots are capable of communicating with each other
within close proximity and can compute their plans of movement. ese objectives are formally
defined in Section 4.
3 Decentralized Mechanisms
We develop decentralized mechanisms that avoid collision dynamically using the principles of
mechanismdesign theory [5]. We provide two mechanisms and show how the laer improves the
performance even though both of them avoid collision. Every decentralizedmechanismdiscussed
in this section is preceded by a computation of the shortest path from the source to destination
for every robot.2
In the current setup, exactly two robots can engage in a collision scenario. A first approach to
avoid collision is to develop a protocol where each robot can independently calculate a plan and
move according to it. e mechanism emerging from such decentralized planning has to ensure
that multiple robots do not appear at the same cell simultaneously.
Since, each robot i ∈ N has a value vi(t) at every time step t, we want the mechanism to
yield a decentralized plan for the robots such that it maximizes the sum of their values. Hence,
this mechanism is economically efficient3 [31, Chap 10]. In the rest of the paper, we will use the
term ‘efficient’ to denote an allocation that maximizes the sum of the valuations of the agents. If
the robots find out that they are leading to a collision, they share information of their values, e.g.,
vi(t) for robot i, and an efficient plan of movement is decided to allow the robot with a higher
value to move and the other to wait – breaking ties arbitrarily. We provide a formal definition of
‘efficiency’ in Section 4.
Our first approach is a naı¨ve decentralized mechanism, shown in Algorithm 1 at time t for
robot i (the mechanism is repeated at every t for every i until each robot reaches its destination).
Note that the other robot j that i may collide with, i.e., has ni(t) = ℓj(t) or ni(t) = nj(t), must
1We assume this for simplicity of the exposition. However, our algorithm works even when the value is non-zero
and has the same time complexity.
2ere are several polynomial-time algorithms to compute such a path [18, e.g.], and we therefore exclude this
part from our description of the mechanism. We will, however, include the path computation time in the empirical
evaluation to make a fair comparison with other collision-avoidance mechanisms.
3Inmicroeconomic theory, the alternative that maximizes the sum of the values of all the agents is called ‘efficient’,
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Algorithm 1 A naı¨ve decentralized collision avoidance mechanism for robot i
1: Input: cells ℓi(t), ni(t), and value vi(t) of robot i
2: Output: a decision for robot i to STOP/GO
3: if ni(t) = ℓj(t), for some j 6= i then
4: STOP at t+ 1
5: else
6: announce the tuple (ℓi(t), ni(t), vi(t)) and receive the same from other nearby robots
7: if ni(t) = nj(t), for some j 6= i then
8: if {vj(t) > vi(t)} or {vj(t) = vi(t) and j > i} then
9: STOP at t+ 1
10: else
11: GO at t+ 1
12: else
13: GO at t + 1
be close to robot i and therefore can communicate with i to announce its current and next cell.
is mechanism is efficient given the value information, i.e., vi’s, of the agents at every t
are accurate. Since the robots in our setup are independently controlled, these information are
private to the agents. Collision mitigation in such scenarios needs amechanism that self-enforces
the agents to reveal it truthfully. is is important in a seing with competing robots, where a
robot can overbid its value to ensure that it is given priority in every collision scenario. e naı¨ve
mechanism in the current form would fail to ensure efficiency if it uses only the reported values
since the strategic robots will overbid to increase their chance of being prioritized.
is is precisely where our approach using the ideas of mechanism design [5] is useful. In
mechanism design theory, it is known that in a private value setup, if the mechanism has no
additional tool to penalize overbidding, only degenerate mechanisms, e.g., dictatorship (where a
pre-selected agent’s favorite outcome is selected always), are truthful [15, 30]. is negative result
also holds in the robot collision seing since the Gibbard-Saerthwaite result extends to seings
with cardinal values as well. A complementary analysis by Roberts [27, m 7.2] shows that a
dictatorship result reappears under certain mild conditions in a quasi-linear seing (which is our
current seing and is formally defined later), unless monetary transfers are allowed. Money, in
these seings, is used as a means of transferring value from an agent to another, and it is shown
to help by unraveling the true values of the agents. In this paper, we, therefore, use monetary
transfers among the agents to ensure truthful value revelation at every round.
Robot payoff model: At every time step t, given the current position of the robots, denote the set
of feasible next-time step configurations by A(t + 1). Hence, for every feasible configuration
a ∈ A(t+1), robot i’s valuation is given by vali(a, vi(t)) = vi(t) if robot i is allowed to move to
ni(t) under a, and zero otherwise. e mechanism also recommends robot i to pay pi(t) amount
of money – which can be negative too, meaning the robot is paid. e net payoff of robot i is
and it is known that it gives rise to a lot of other desirable properties. For a complete discussion, see [5].
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given by the widely used quasi-linear formula [31, Chap 10]
vali(a, vi(t))− pi(t). (1)
A strategic robot reports its private information vi(t) to maximize its net payoff. We assume that
the robots are myopic, i.e., consider maximizing their immediate payoff. A mechanism in such a
seing is defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Mechanism) A mechanism (f := [ft]t=1,2,...,p := [pi,t]i∈N,t=1,2,...) is a tuple which
decides the allocation and payment for every robot at every time step t. Here the allocation function
at time t is given by ft : R
n 7→ A(t + 1) that decides the next location of every robot i ∈ N ,
and pi,t : R
n 7→ R denotes the payment made by the robot. Hence, ft(v1(t), . . . , vn(t)) and
pi,t(v1(t), . . . , vn(t)) denote the allocation and payment of robot i respectively at time step t.
We assume that the robots agree to a mechanism (f ,p) and compute them locally and follow
the movement given by f and pay according to p to a central authority. In this paper, we consider
allocation and payment functions to be stationary, i.e., independent of t.
Under this setup, the naı¨ve decentralized mechanism (Algorithm 1) can be made truthful by
adding the following payment rule. e robot that is prioritized pays the amount equal to the bid
of the robot that stops at that time. is is the well-known second price auction [37], which is
known to be truthful, and we run this at every instant and for every potentially colliding pair of
robots.
We notice that in Algorithm 1, the robots do not simultaneously move to the same cell and
therefore successfully avoid collision in a decentralized manner. However, this mechanism can
lead to the following deadlock scenario. Suppose the intersection is of four full-duplex paths with
four cells at the intersection (Figure 2). If there are two robots at the intersection and two more
are aempting to enter, and both the entering robots wins the auction step (Step 8) in Algorithm 1,
it will lead to the four cells at the intersection occupied with four robots. If these robots’ next
locations are the current locations of the robots already in the intersection, none of them can
move under this mechanism (see Figure 2).
To avoid such a deadlock, a mechanism cannot allow more than (m − 1) robots to enter an
intersection of capacitym. Our proposed decentralizedmechanismSPARCAS (SPotAuction-
based Robotic Collision Avoidance Scheme) considers the quasi-linear payoff model, takes ac-
count of the known facts of mechanism design, and modifies the naı¨ve mechanism to avoid such
a deadlock along with other desirable properties. For a given graphG, let the set of indices of the
intersection vertices be represented byK . Denote the cells of intersection vertex k ∈ K by Ik(V ).
SPARCASmodifies how the robots enter an intersection. At every time step t, for intersection
k, it finds the set of robots Nk(t) that are either inside the intersection or are aempting to enter
the intersection. From the information shared by all the robots (ℓi(t), ni(t), vi(t)), i ∈ Nk(t), the
mechanism allows every robot i ∈ Nk(t) to find the feasible next-step configurations Ak(t + 1)
at that intersection. e feasible configurations ensure that there are no more than (m − 1)
robots in the intersection of capacitym. e set of feasible next-step configurations A(t + 1) is
an union of the individual feasible configurations Ak(t + 1) at each intersection k ∈ K . At the
non-intersection cells, every robot advances to a cell in its shortest path unless that is already
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auction winning robot
auction winning robot
dashed arrows show the past position
deadlock
and direction of the red robots
Figure 2: Example of a deadlock scenario. Arrows denote their intended direction of move.
occupied by robot – we keep these configurations out of the allocations (e.g., Ak(t)’s) since we
do not need a collective decision there. e proposed mechanism picks the configuration
ak ∈ argmax
a∈Ak(t+1)
∑
i∈Nk(t)
vali(a, vi(t)). (2)
e configurationmaximizes the social welfare (sumof the values of all the agents) of all the robots
that are either inside or are entering the intersection. Denote this configuration by a∗k(t + 1).
Similarly, we can define a welfare maximizing configuration excluding robot i as follows.
a
Nk(t)\{i}
k ∈ argmax
b∈A
Nk(t)\{i}
k
(t+1)
∑
j∈Nk(t)\{i}
valj(b, vj(t)). (3)
is choice maximizes the social welfare of all the robots except i. Denote this configuration by
a
∗,Nk(t)\{i}
k (t+ 1). Define the following expression for payment
pi(t) :=
∑
j∈Nk(t)\{i}
valj(a
∗,Nk(t)\{i}
k (t+ 1), vj(t))
−
∑
j∈Nk(t)\{i}
valj(a
∗
k(t+ 1), vj(t)) (4)
We are now ready to present our proposed mechanism SPARCAS. For agent i at time t, it is
described in Algorithm 2. As before, the mechanism is repeated at every t for every i until each
robot reaches its destination.
Algorithm 2 describes the mechanism from the individual agents’ point of view. e consoli-
dated payment collected by the trusted authority at intersection k at t from all the robots at that
intersection is distributed equally to the robots that were not part of intersection k at t. erefore,
SPARCAS does not accumulate money from the agents.
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Algorithm 2 SPARCAS for robot i at time t
1: Input: cells ℓi(t), ni(t), and value vi(t) of robot i
2: Output: a decision for robot i to STOP/GO
3: if ℓi(t), ni(t) /∈ Il(V ), ∀l ∈ K then
4: if ni(t) = ℓj(t), for some j 6= i then
5: STOP at t + 1
6: else
7: GO at t + 1
8: else
9: announce the tuple (ℓi(t), ni(t), vˆi(t)) (reported value vˆi(t) can be different from the true
value vi(t)) and receive the same from other nearby robots
10: consider announced tuples of other agents who are in/heading to the same intersection:
(ℓj(t), nj(t), vˆj(t)), j ∈ Nk(t) \ {i}, where k is s.t. ni(t) ∈ Ik(V )
11: compute a∗k(t+1) (Equation (2)) and STOP/GO according to that recommendation in time
t+ 1
12: pay pi(t) (Equation (4)) to a trusted authority (e.g., warehouse manager)
Locally centralized via intersection manager: SPARCAS does not need any synchronization
among the robots except that they all follow a common clock (which is also a standard assumption
in robot collision avoidance literature [38, 39, 35, e.g.]). Yet, in Section 5, we show that it satisfies
many desirable properties. However, there is some computational redundancy in SPARCAS.
Step 11 of Algorithm 2 is computed by every robot involved in themechanismnear an intersection
point, and this makes the mechanism completely decentralized. A presence of an intersection
manager (a trusted intermediary) at Ik(V ) who can collect the reported (ℓi(t), ni(t), vˆi(t)), ∀i ∈
Nk(t) and compute it once and inform all the robots in Nk(t) could substantially reduce the cost
of computation of every robot. ough this will come at a slight compromise in the decentralized
feature of SPARCAS, we want to make the reader informed about both the versions of the
mechanism.
In the following section, we define certain desirable properties for decentralized robot colli-
sion avoidance schemes and show that SPARCAS satisfies all of them.
4 Design Desiderata
In a decentralized robot path planning, the agents choose their own route from the source to
the destination. e collision avoidance mechanism ensures a protocol that is applied locally
at a potential colliding scenario. e property desirable in such a seing is of locally efficient
prioritization.
Definition 2 (Local Efficiency) A robotic collision avoidance mechanism (f ,p) is locally effi-
cient if for every time t, every intersection k ∈ K , it chooses an allocation that maximizes the sum
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value of all the robots. Formally, it picks ∀t, ∀k ∈ K
f(vi(t), i ∈ Nk(t)) ∈ argmax
a∈Ak(t+1)
∑
i∈Nk(t)
vali(a, vi(t)).
However, in a multi-agent seing, vi(t)’s of the robots are unknown to the mechanism, which
can only access the reported values vˆi(t)’s. erefore, the following property ensures that the
robots are incentivized to ‘truthfully’ reveal these information.
Definition 3 (Dominant Strategy Truthfulness) A mechanism (f ,p) is truthful in dominant
strategies if for every t, vi(t), vˆi(t), vˆ−i(t)
4, and i ∈ N
vali(f(vi(t), vˆ−i(t)), vi(t))− pi(vi(t), vˆ−i(t))
> vali(f(vˆi(t), vˆ−i(t)), vi(t))− pi(vˆi(t), vˆ−i(t)).
e inequality above shows that if the true value of robot i is vi(t), the allocation and payment
resulting from reporting it ‘truthfully’ maximizes its payoff irrespective of the reports of the other
robots.
Since we consider mechanisms with monetary transfer, an important question is whether
it generates a surplus amount of money. e following property ensures that there is neither
surplus nor deficit.
Definition 4 (Budget Balance) A mechanism (f ,p) is budget balanced if for every t and
(vi(t), v−i(t)),
∑
i∈N pi(vi(t), v−i(t)) = 0.
In the context of decentralized robot path planning, a mechanism that is robust against robot
failures is highly desirable. Also, it is desirable if a robot can start its journey when other robots
are already in motion, and the mechanism does not need other robots to re-compute their path
plan.
Definition 5 (Entry-Exit Robustness) A mechanism (f ,p) is robust against entry or exit of
the robots if the properties satisfied by the other robots’ path plans are unaffected by an addition or
deletion of a robot under the mechanism.
Centralized collision avoidance mechanisms that compute the paths and recommends that to all
the robots are not robust against entry or exit. With every addition or deletion of a robot, the plan
has to be recomputed. It is to be noted that decentralization alone cannot guarantee entry-exit
robustness. Decentralization only implies that the decisions are taken independently by each of
the robots. It does not restrict the way in which they interact with each other. Based on the
interaction, the plan may not be robust against entry-exit, as the following example shows.
Example 1 (Decentralized but not Entry-Exit Robust) Consider the following decentralized
version of the prioritized planning algorithm. Before beginning to move, the robots send their identi-
ties on a common channel (assume that there is a wired broadcast channel connecting all the starting
4We use the subscript −i to denote all the agents except agent i, therefore, v
−i := (v1, . . . , vi−1, vi+1, . . . , vn).
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positions), but this common channel is not available when they are on the move. e highest priority
robot computes its path and broadcasts it (the priority order is fixed beforehand and is a common
knowledge of all the robots). Aer listening to that plan, the second highest priority robot plans its
path considering the former as a dynamic obstacle and broadcast, and the process continues for robots
of the next priorities. Aer all robots compute their plans in this decentralized manner, they leave
their parking slots and follow their pre-decided (but decentralized) plan of movement. is scheme
is clearly not robust against entry-exit. A newly joined robot does not have the earlier broadcast
messages and hence cannot plan its path. Also if that robot has a higher priority than some of the
robots that are moving already, then those lesser priority robots cannot change their path plan.
In the following section, we show that our proposed mechanism satisfies all these properties.
In Section 6, we consider a real warehouse seing and exhibit the performance of SPARCAS
in practice.
5 eoretical guarantees
e property of truthfulness is important in the multi-agent seing since it ensures that the
allocation decision is taken on the true values of vi(t)’s and the actual locally efficient allocations
were done.
eorem 1 SPARCAS is dominant strategy truthful.
Proof : is proof is a standard exercise in the line of the proof for Vickery-Clarke-Groves (VCG)
mechanism [37, 9, 16]. SPARCAS follows the VCG allocation and payment locally at every
intersection calculated by the robots independently. Hence, the payoff of robot i at intersection
k is given by (for brevity of notation, we hide the time argument in every function and write a∗k
as a∗k(vi, v−i))
vali(a
∗
k(vi, vˆ−i), vi)− pi(vi, vˆ−i)
=
∑
j∈Nk
valj(a
∗
k(vi, vˆ−i), vˆj)−
∑
j∈Nk\{i}
valj(a
∗,Nk\{i}
k , vˆj)
>
∑
j∈Nk
valj(a
∗
k(vˆi, vˆ−i), vˆj)−
∑
j∈Nk\{i}
valj(a
∗,Nk\{i}
k , vˆj)
= vali(a
∗
k(vˆi, vˆ−i), vi)− pi(vˆi, vˆ−i).
e first equality is obtained by writing and reorganizing the expression for pi. e inequality
holds since by definition
∑
j∈Nk
valj(a
∗
k(vi, vˆ−i), vˆj) >
∑
j∈Nk
valj(ak, vˆj) for every ak; in
particular, we chose a∗k(vˆi, vˆ−i). e last equality is obtained by reorganizing the expressions
again. 
SPARCAS redistributes the generated money from a particular intersection k to the robots
who are not part of it at that time step (see the paragraph following Algorithm 2). Clearly, this
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does not affect the truthfulness properties. e generated surplus before redistributing can be
shown to be always non-negative.5 e allocation of SPARCAS, given by Equation (2), maxi-
mizes the social welfare at every intersection. erefore, it is locally efficient. Hence we get the
following theorem.
eorem 2 SPARCAS is budget balanced and locally efficient.
SPARCAS satisfies certain properties by construction. e following claim summarizes
them and we explain it below.
Claim 1 SPARCAS is decentralized, collision-free, deadlock-free, and robust against entry or exit.
In SPARCAS, each robot near an intersection point does message passing, compute the
allocation and then move synchronously according to it. Each of the robots at an intersection
computes the same allocation which keeps one block in the intersection empty (see the definition
of the allocation set Ak). us the robots avoid collision and deadlock, and the mechanism is
completely decentralized.
Note that SPARCAS depends only on the values reported by the robots that are already in
an intersection or are about to enter it. A newly entered robot can at most take part in such an in-
teraction, but cannot change the way other robots in other intersections interact with each other.
Hence, the properties that those robots were satisfying before the entry of this robot continue to
be satisfied. Hence we get the claim.
In the following section, we investigate the performance of SPARCAS in real-world sce-
narios.
6 Experiments
While SPARCAS satisfies several desirable properties of a collision avoidance mechanism, its
scalability, time complexity to find a collision-avoiding path, and differentiated treatment with
different classes of robots are not theoretically captured in the previous sections. is is why an
experimental study is called for. Note that the mechanisms that fall in the third set of approaches
in §1 either only use the bidding part of the auctions and not the payment which is essential
to guarantee truthfulness in an auction [21, 3, 22, 6] or is a reduced combinatorial auction of
the centralized algorithm [1]. Either way they are incomparable with SPARCAS, which is
truthful and decentralized. We compare SPARCASwith two widely used protocols for multi-
agent path finding – (a) M* [38]: optimal, but has a significant time complexity, and (b) prioritized
planning [35]: suboptimal, but has low time complexity.
To evaluate SPARCAS experimentally, we use a 2-D rectangular workspace representing
a road network. An example of such a workspace of size 16 × 16 is shown in Figure 3. A robot
picks and delivers an object from and to a cell in the service area. Each robot follows the traffic
5e intuition for this claim is that absence of a robot reduces congestion, which leads to the other robots being
allowed to move. is increases the sum of the values of the other robots. erefore, we skip a formal proof of this
fact.
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rules in the road network, and moves along with the directions of the arrows from the source to
the destination. It can change its direction only within an intersection cell, but its options are
restricted by the available traffic directions in that particular intersection cell.
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Figure 3: Illustration of a 16× 16 workspace.
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Figure 4: Path planning and auction times of
SPARCAS. e numbers on the bars show
the workspacewidth for each number of robots.
We have implemented SPARCAS in Python.6 e simulations have been performed in a
64-bit Ubuntu 14.04 LTS machine with Intel(R) Core TM i7-4770 CPU@3.40 GHz× 20 processors
and 128 GB RAM. Each run for a specific number of robots and the workspace size is performed
20 times to calculate the average of the result. e source and goal locations of the robots are
selected independently and uniformly at random from the cells of the service area.
A robot is generated uniformly at random from one of the three classes: economy, regular,
premium having weights 0.02, 0.065, and 0.2 respectively.7 At every time instant of the experi-
ments, the valuation of a robot entering an intersection is assumed to be (twait + 1) × w, where
twait is the wait time of the robot till that instant and w is the weight as described above.
6.1 Scalability
We evaluated the scalability of SPARCAS on workspaces of four different sizes: 100 × 100,
198 × 198, 401 × 401 and 499 × 499,8 and for different number of robots between 10 and 500.
Figure 4 shows how the computation time of SPARCAS varies with the number of robots and
the size of the workspace. e computation time of SPARCAS has two components: (a) time
for an offline path computation and (b) the time required to run the spot auctions (given by
Algorithm 2) online. In our experiments, we assumed that the robots compute their paths to
reach the destination using A* algorithm [18]. As this computation can take place in parallel, we
count the maximum of the plan computation times for all the robots as the offline computation
6All codes are available at https://bit.ly/2lx0fHk
7Weights are increasing with a rough multiplying factor of 3.25.
8ese numbers ensure a regular paern of the workspace of Figure 3.
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time (part (a)). We assume that each plan execution slot is preceded by a mini-slot when the
auction can take place at any intersection. We take the product of the duration of the mini-slot
dedicated for auction and themaximumnumber of steps to finish the plan execution for any robot
(the makespan) to find the total time spent in spot auction (part (b)). e duration for the mini-
slot has been decided based on extensive simulation with different reasonably-sized workspaces
and robot populations.
6.2 Comparison with static multi-robot planning algorithms
We compare the performance of SPARCASwith that of M* [38] and prioritized planning [35],
two state-of-the-art multi-robot path planning algorithms. e original version of M* ensures
the optimality of the generated multi-robot plan in terms of the total cost (sum of the time for
all the robots to reach destination). However, a variant of M* called inflated M* can produce a
sub-optimal plan faster than the original M*. We compareSPARCASwith inflated M* too. e
prioritized planning algorithm also does not provide any optimality guarantee, but can generate
collision-free paths much more time-efficiently than both versions of M*.
We compareSPARCAS, M*, inflatedM*, and prioritized planning for a 100×100workspace
and different number of robots upto 500 robots. We have set a timeout of 1200s. If the compu-
tation does not finish before the timeout, we consider the timeout duration as the computation
time of the algorithms (which is a lower bound). e experimental results are shown in Figure 5.
e lines connect through the average values of the planning times, while the actual planning
times for 20 runs for every number of robots are scaered according to their values in the fig-
ure. e results show that SPARCAS outperforms all the other three algorithms in terms of
computation time. M* and inflated M* algorithms do not scale beyond 75 robots for this timeout.
We also compare the makespan (maximum time among all robots to reach destination) and
average path execution time (the average of the individual path lengths) for the mechanisms for
a workspace of size 100 × 100 in Figure 6. e method of the plot is identical to Figure 5. e
numbers on top of the bars show the percentage of successful completion (not hiing timeout).
e results show that there is not much difference in the execution part of these mechanisms
and that SPARCAS provides a path which is very close in length to that of the optimal path
generated by M*.
6.3 Delays of different priority classes
We compare how long robots of different classes (economy, regular, and premium) take to reach
their destinations. e first and second subplots of Figure 7 show the average waiting times and
payments respectively of the different classes of robots for a workspace size of 100×100. We see
that for a reasonable congestion,SPARCAS prioritizes the higher classes for a greater payment.
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Figure 5: e y-axis shows the total planning
time (in sec) of the different algorithms and
the x-axis shows the number of robots. For
SPARCAS, the planning time is the sum of
the offline path computation and online spot
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Figure 7: Average waiting time (in sec) and payments under SPARCAS for different classes of
robots.
6.4 Experiments with ROS
We have simulated SPARCAS for up to 10 TurtleBots [14] on ROS [26]. We have used a
workspace of size 14 × 14 (similar to Figure 3) with each grid cell of length 1m. e linear
and the angular velocity of the TurtleBots have been chosen in such a way that each motion
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primitive takes 6.5s for execution. e maximum time for running an auction (decides the length
of a mini-slot) observed in all our experiments is about 60ms. e video of our experiments is
submied as a supplementary material.
We also ran experiments to find out (a) the payments underSPARCAS, and (b) the capability
to handle dynamic arrival of robots. e payments are sufficiently small and the dynamic arrivals
are gracefully handled in SPARCAS. e details of these experiments are in the supplemental
material.
6.5 Capability of handling dynamic robot arrival
In this section, we study the robustness ofSPARCAS against dynamic robot arrivals. e setup
remains similar to the previous subsection – we mention the differences as follows. We partition
the total number of robots into two groups of equal size for this evaluation. e first group of
robots arrive at the beginning. e rest 50% of the robots arrive independently and uniformly
at random within the time interval of zero and the length of the workspace. In SPARCAS, a
newly arrived robot computes its own path by using the A* algorithm [18], and starts to follow
that path immediately. However, in M*, a newly arrived robot requests path to the centralized M*
path planner. e M* planner collects such requests and waits for re-planning until the number
of the newly arrived robots exceeds a predefined threshold. In our experiments, this threshold is
set to 2. During the re-planning, the M* planner considers the current locations of the previously
arrived robots as their source locations and excludes the robots which already have reached their
respective goal locations. For prioritized planning, the robots that arrive later are considered to
have a lower priority than the robots arrived already, and compute their path considering the
previous robots’ positions as dynamic obstacles. Figure 8 shows the results of the experiments
for two different workspace sizes: 100× 100 and 198× 198.
6.6 Payments under SPARCAS
SPARCAS is different from the other collision avoiding mechanisms in its use of payments
which ensure truthful participation of the competitive robots. erefore, it is a natural question
to find out how large the payments are in comparison with the valuations received by the robots.
In our experiment with a workspace size of 100 × 100, 95.12% of the robots were never needed
to pay. For the number of robots: 10, 20, 30, 40, 50 and 75, the tuple of average valuation and
average payment of the robots were (1.9, 7.5 × 10−4), (2.16, 23.75 × 10−4), (2.2, 47.5 × 10−4),
(2.33, 47.5 × 10−4), (2.41, 63 × 10−4), and (2.56, 134.7× 10−4) respectively. Similarly, another
important question is whether the robots encounter a negative payoff, i.e., payment more than
valuation. In the experiment, we find that the answer to this is negative. Hence the robots have
incentives to voluntarily participate in this mechanism. We also find, quite expectedly as was
argued in Footnote 5, that the payments by the robots are always non-negative.
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Figure 8: e y-axis shows the total planning time (in sec) of the algorithms and the x-axis shows
the number of robots. For SPARCAS, the planning time is the sum of the offline path compu-
tation and online spot auction times.
7 Discussions
We presented a scalable decentralized collision avoidance mechanism for a competitive multi-
robot system using ideas of mechanism design. We prove that it is truthful, efficient, deadlock-
free, and budget-balanced. We exhibit experimentally that it is scalable to hundreds of robots,
and can handle dynamic arrival without compromising the path-length optimality too much. In
future, we would like to extend the algorithm to multi-intersection ‘traffic-jam’s and conduct
experiments on a real multi-robot system.
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